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aBsTRaCT
The Pacification Police Units (UPPs), created to recover territories (favelas) dominated by drug 
traffickers in the city of Rio de Janeiro, came about as a result of the courage and leadership of the head of 
Public Security Bureau in the State of Rio de Janeiro. The UPPs were created at the initiative of a public ad-
ministrator and, initially, without the support of the State, and have since become one of the most respect-
ed and widely recognized organizations in Brazilian society.  Due to the success at dismantling the gangs 
that controlled the favelas and constituted a parallel state within them, UPPs have become the center of a 
public policy that has allowed their deployment in other underserved communities. In turn, this has ena-
bled the installation of other public services and facilities such as schools and health centers in the favelas, 
as well as creating the conditions for the local population to freely come and go. Therefore, the purpose of 
this article is to analyze the role of leadership in the creation and planning of the UPPs distributed among 
the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. In preparing this article, emphasis has been given to the use of oral history, a 
methodology that focuses on the history of the present through the narrative of the subjects who partici-
pated in the events. The Situational Strategic Planning and the Freirean perspective were used for analysis. 
The story of the UPPs was found to revolve around the existence or not of leaders inside and outside the 
favelas. Even with 37 UPPs already installed in the city of Rio de Janeiro, each one being the result of a 
different experience with the communities, the role of the leaders in the favelas is still emphasized. 
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ResUmo
As Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs), criadas para recuperar territórios dominados pelo trá-
fico na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, nasceram, em grande medida, da ousadia e capacidade de liderança de um 
gestor público. A partir da iniciativa deste gestor, inicialmente, sem apoio do Estado, foi criada, em 2008, a 
UPP. Com seu sucesso, ao desarticular quadrilhas que controlavam as favelas, as UPPs foram transformadas 
em política pública que prevê sua instalação nas comunidades carentes do Rio de Janeiro, viabilizando outras 
instalações públicas, como escolas e postas de saúde, além de criar condições para que as populações des-
tes locais tenham liberdade de ir e vir. O objetivo deste artigo é tratar do papel da liderança no processo de 
história da criação e planejamento das UPPs distribuídas nas favelas do Rio de Janeiro. Foi utilizada a história 
oral, uma metodologia que privilegia a história do tempo presente através da narrativa dos sujeitos que parti-
ciparam dos acontecimentos. Para análise, foram utilizadas as perspectivas de Paulo Freire e do Planejamento 
Estratégico Situacional. A história das UPPs gira em torno da existência ou não de líderes dentro e fora das 
favelas. Mesmo com 37 UPPs já instaladas na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, cada uma é o resultado de uma expe-
riência diferente com as comunidades, o papel dos líderes nas favelas ainda é enfatizada.
Palavras-chave: Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs), liderança, planejamento.
1 inTRodUCTion
The transfer of Brazil’s Capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília, in 1960, left a political 
and economic void in the city of Rio de Janeiro. It was fifteen years before a new role was finally 
defined for the city of Rio de Janeiro. Several institutional designs were suggested for the former 
capital city, ranging between two extremes. At one extreme, the symbolic leadership role of the 
city as the “lighthouse of the nation” was defended, by which its importance and distinction at 
the national level would be maintained by transforming it into a city-state. At the other extreme, 
the city of Rio de Janeiro would become the capital city of a state with the same name, in a model 
that put it at the same level as the other units in the Brazilian Federal Republic, and therefore 
“a city like any other,” that would seek to establish greater regional integration (MOTTA, 2002.)
Thus, in 1975, the ‘Marvelous City’, as Rio de Janeiro city is often called, became the capi-
tal of the new state of Rio de Janeiro, a fusion of the former state of Guanabara and the municipality 
of Rio de Janeiro. In the early years, “the average annual real growth of the state in the period 1974-
1978 was 7.8%, while, in 1978 domestic income showed an increase of 35% compared to 1974” 
(MOTTA, 2002 p. 29). However, in the 1980s, a period known as the “lost decade”, the economic 
situation in Rio de Janeiro deteriorated due to a convergence of factors. Between 1989 and 1992, its 
gross domestic product fell by 15%, which was one of the worst rates in Brazil at that time. Between 
1991 and 1996, 180,000 manufacturing jobs were lost in the state (LESSA, 2000). This process of 
economic decline was intensified by the transfer of a large number of companies to other states 
and by the closure of plants in areas that were becoming increasingly violent.
The Complexo do Alemão, for example, one of the most violent areas of the city, formed 
by a set of twelve favelas, located in the north of the city, had previously housed several facto-
ries that closed as the violence escalated in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The Complexo do Alemão 
had been the home of the largest of tanning and leather goods industry in the Americas and the 
second in the largest in the world, employing around 3,000 people. Until the 1980s, the area now 
covered by the favelas that now make up the Complexo do Alemão, contained the city’s main 
industrial complex. However, by the early 1990s, with the increasing levels of violence, coupled 
with the economic crisis of that period, it is estimated that about 20,000 jobs were lost in that 
region alone. With the closure of factories, the area gradually acquired a new setting, with people 
living in extreme or absolute poverty, and eventually drug trafficking took over the region to the 
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extent that the presence of the State became unfeasible (OLIVEIRA, 2010, p. 1,567). A similar pat-
tern of events was repeated in many poor communities in Rio de Janeiro, especially those, better 
known as favelas, located among the hills that make up the geography of the city.
The gradual deterioration of the political and economic conditions of the city exacerbated 
urban violence that had its peak in the 1990s, as noted by Leite (2000, p. 73), “over the 1990s, Rio 
de Janeiro acquired the profile of a violent city. Murders, robberies, assaults, kidnappings, armed 
confrontations between rival gangs or between them and the police took over the streets in a way 
that was unheard of in terms of their frequency, magnitude, spatial location and the threat they 
posed”. In this period, there was also an escalation of police violence and the city was dominated by 
the “metaphor of war”. The escalating violence in the city of Rio de Janeiro had a direct impact not 
only on the safety of the population, but also on the State’s economic development. In an almost 
tautological proposition, there was an even greater growth the rates of violence. Finally, there was a 
separation between the asphalt (plain) and favela (on the morro (hill)). The ‘asphalt’ was the home 
of the middle class, those people perceived by police as citizens who deserve the protection of the 
State, but who were prisoners in their own homes, threatened by the population in the favelas, 
where the residents were only entitled to “sub-citizenship” (LEITE, 2003). This is because the crimi-
nal gangs did not permit the presence of the State in the favelas, and on the rare occasions that the 
State intervened, it was in the form of military actions involving heavily armed soldiers in attempts 
to reduce the fighting between rival gangs for the territorial dominance of the morros (favelas). This 
was the situation of the city of Rio de Janeiro until 2009.
This situation is gradually being reversed with the putting into practice of a simple idea: 
to recover for the State those impoverished territories, dominated by armed drug traffickers and 
militias. This means that the State is making itself present in territories from which it was once 
barred, mainly through the insertion of Pacification Police Units (UPPs) (FRANCO, 2012). This ar-
ticle is mainly concerned with the creation and planning of these UPPs and especially the role of 
the leadership in driving the process of creating the UPPs.
The role of leadership in creating the UPPs in Rio de Janeiro from the perspective of Situational 
Strategic Planning and the Freirean perspective: the theory
Leadership
Gillén (2010) claims, that until 1969, sociologists published many more articles on lead-
ership than psychologists and management theorists. But as from the late 1990s, the literature 
on leadership coming from psychologists and management theorists has increased dramatical-
ly and currently articles on leadership authored by sociologists correspond to less than 10% of 
those published on the subject, even if we only consider the management theorists. 
The most apparent consequence of this phenomenon is that the hegemonic literature 
on leadership, especially that originating from the mainstream management scholars, points, al-
most exclusively, in one direction: developing new leaders and training leaders who can get results 
(GILLÉN, 2010). This is because the leader is considered that person with superhuman and lifesaving 
qualities who, based on a dependent relationship established with those who are led, is perceived 
as being critical for the effectiveness of public and private organizational systems (GANZ, 2010; ZU-
PAN, 2010). As pointed out by Duarte and Pope (2011), the most widely used concept of leadership 
emphasizes interpersonal influence, the personal and situational ability of a particular individual, 
i.e., the ability to attract the led, to know how to lead them to achieve and overcome certain goals. 
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In Latin America, this literature has been widely publicized and accepted, largely due to 
a cultural characteristic of Latin American people: the belief that a leader can change the reality 
of a country or a people. This has been the case in Brazil and Argentina, among others. The poor 
people of these countries, possibly due to naivety or other reasons, are led to believe that a man, 
a savior, will be able to solve all the problems (HILGERS, 2012). If such a leader dies, for example, 
the immediate prospects for solving the problem would be to adopt a faithful follower of the 
leader-savior as the new leader. That is a new savior who maintains that emotional dependency 
and hence the belief in the lack of the population’s organizational capacity. 
In ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970), Paulo Freire considered the role of such leaders 
in Latin America and argued that this type of leadership leads the people to be enticed by pop-
ulism and become mere pawns. Political action with the oppressed, according to Freire (1970) 
would require acting with them, with the led. Their emotional dependence, the result of the 
domination in which they find themselves and which creates a false view of the world, can be 
enjoyed by nobody, but the oppressor (the false leader). Only the leader-oppressor is able to take 
advantage of this dependence in order to create greater dependency. 
This does not mean that there is no place for the leader in the Freirean perspective. It 
just means that leadership is not the owner but of the popular masses or those who lead tempo-
rarily however important, fundamental, indispensable that role may be. The importance of that 
role does not give such a leader the right to command people blindly toward a goal. If this were 
so, such a leader would repeat the role of messianic savior, even while attempting to achieve the 
“salvation” of those he/she leads (FREIRE, 1970). 
According to Freire (1987), true leadership has an educational role and is provided with-
in a context of co-intentionality. “Educators and students (the leader and the led), co-intent on 
reality, find themselves engaged in a task in which they are both subjects in the act, not only of 
unraveling and to unveiling reality, in fact, but also of recreating it, transforming it” (Freire, 1987, 
p. 31). From the Freirean perspective, leadership it is not something that is predetermined or 
subject to training. The leaders discover themselves and emerge during the process of trans-
forming their reality; when they are immersed and conscious of this transformation. It is not like 
a magic trick, it is necessary to understand the context, be part of it, know the other subjects and 
want to change what is placed before them.
It is from within this perspective that Carlos Matus (1991, 1993) formulated the Situa-
tional Strategic Planning (SSP), a method of governmental strategic planning, based on decades 
of experience in public administration in Latin America, in which leadership is seen not as kind of 
messianism, but as the result of work an engaged work of the leader. “SSP is a method, a theory 
of the Public Strategic Planning Office. It is designed to serve the political leaders, the government 
or the opposition. It is concerned with public problems and is applicable to any organ that is not 
exclusively market-centered, but is within political, economic and social game “(MATUS, 1996, p. 
23). This approach will be used in this article to show how the UPPs were created and planned. 
As with the leadership approach used by Paulo Freire, Situational Strategic Planning (SSP) is little 
known or used among mainstream Management. This is because from the SSP perspective, it is 
not possible to plan the life a certain set or of a community and get predefined results as if all the 
other subjects involved were paralyzed and remained so until the desired results are achieved.
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Situational Strategic Planning 
The SSP, which takes reality itself as its basis, assumes that it is possible to devise a plan, 
but that one cannot choose the circumstances in which it will be executed. The SSP takes into 
account that the participants in a social game do not behave in a predictable manner, in addition, 
seek to maximize the use of the limited resources they have in order to augment them with each 
new move. This means that no player can apply deterministic reasoning, such as “If I choose path 
X, the consequence will be Y.” In this case, the position of the leader is that of one among many 
others in the game and is not given as certain.
According to Matus (1993), if the governor (leader) wants to achieve good results, from 
the perspective of SSP, he must learn to play the social game. One should also consider and rec-
ognize that in SSP, the actor who plans in a social game, is also fighting for space, resources, and 
influence, like any other, however powerful and influential that actor might be. The governor, 
therefore, must be prepared for four problems: to know how to explain the reality of the game; 
know how to outline proposals for action in uncertain conditions; know how to develop strate-
gies to deal with the other players and the circumstances, to calculate what it is possible to do, 
at every moment, in relation to what can be done to achieve the goals; and to know how to it 
effectively at an opportune moment, recalculating and completing the plan with additional sub-
ordinated improvisation (MATUS, 1991).
Thus, according to Matus (1996), SSP can be summarized in four questions that organ-
ize and guide the development of the plan itself and incorporate the four problems mentioned 
above: How to explain the reality? How to design a plan? How to make the necessary plan feasi-
ble? How to act as planned every day?
These are four questions correspond to four basic moments in the development of the 
methodological approach proposed by Matus (1996): the explanatory, the normative, the strate-
gic and the tactical operational moments. However, it must be made clear that “these moments 
cannot be seen or treated as steps. They are dynamic, are often repeated, though the content, 
sphere, place and time may change. Therefore, they should be viewed as a kind of spiral, not as 
a sequence or something gradual” (ADUM and COELHO, 2007, p. 5). One must remember that 
reality does not follow a predetermined sequence.
Firstly, the explanatory moment, is to recognize there are several true explanations 
about the same reality, and especially, that the explanations of opposing players are not the same 
because each explanation of reality depends on who is explaining that reality. In this case, the 
leader who is the planner and who is also a player, needs to consider that it will not be possible to 
solve the problem of the various explanations by stating that one is true and the others are false. 
But how can one plan in the midst of so many truths? 
For Matus (1996), the greater the planner’s ability to understand the game and the 
diverse interests of the players, the greater that planner will be. Therefore, it is in the planner’s 
interest to know the explanations of those who are competing against or cooperating with him/
her because with this knowledge he/she can play better. The planner’s explanation becomes 
more powerful if it considers and, at the same time, differs from those of the other players. In this 
case, the more the planner understands the other players, the more assertive the planner will be. 
Understanding the other player, however, does not mean one is obliged to accept his arguments, 
nor yielding. It means understanding the ‘position’ of the other players in the game, and especial-
ly to understand the ‘key’ with which he reads his reality and that of the other players.
It is worth noting also that SSP focuses on problems rather than on sectors as does tradi-
tional or normative planning. “Reality creates problems, threats and opportunities. The politician 
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works with the problems and the people suffer because of the problems. Real problems trans-
verse sectors and there are actors that benefit from or are harmed by them and the actors in the 
social game deal with problems rather than sectors” (MATUS, 1996, p. 35). Working with prob-
lems means: explaining how a problem arises and develops; making plans to attack the causes 
of the problem by means of operations; analyzing the political feasibility of the plan or checking 
how to make it feasible; and attacking the problem in practice, conducting planned operations. 
Hence, for SSP, the first step is to describe the problem with the enumeration of facts showing 
that the problem really exists.
In the case studied here, the basic problem for the government of Rio de Janeiro was, 
and continues to be, that in some areas of the city, the territory is under the control of the drug 
traffickers, which virtually precludes the presence of the State.
The normative moment, in turn, refers to the design of the plan, in the identification 
of actions that can be implemented to address the problems. For Matus (1993), this is the mo-
ment to select the possible operations and actions necessary to achieve the objectives. The plan 
takes the form of proposals for decisions to be taken based on the perceived initial situation. The 
normative moment, then, requires an approximate calculation of the results. To do so, it is neces-
sary to recognize the existence of uncertainty and surprises, working with scenarios, contingency 
plans and other appropriate methods, i.e., recognizing the potential for action of the other actors 
involved. Thus, SSP takes into account a certain situation-goal that is conditional on a scenario 
and the possibility of other occurrences because reality is not predictable.
This means that the planner that uses SSP must recognize that there is an asymmetry 
between the past and the future. The past is over, the future is open to many possibilities and 
we cannot imagine them all. One can only list the future possibilities, not all of them, and one 
cannot assign probabilities. How many and what possibilities are included in the list depends on 
the analyst (planner), his imagination, experience and knowledge of the situation. Nevertheless, 
however competent the planner, the list will always be incomplete and there is always the risk. 
Thus, according to Matus (1996, p. 64), for planners who opt for SSP, “the plan cannot be a scien-
tific calculation but is instead based on the concept of the strategically-based gamble. “The plan 
is a gamble, and for some tamed mentalities, this seems like a lack of systematization”. The plan 
is a gamble because its outcome does not only depend on the plan itself. It also depends on the 
circumstances that are uncontrollable and impossible to predict.
The strategic moment is the feasibility of the plan is analyzed in order to determine 
‘what can be done’ and ‘how to do it’, seeking to identify strategies that can be used. For SSP, it is 
necessary to consider the possible strategies in the light of the behavior of the other actors and 
the capabilities involved. One must therefore consider the power relations, the political pow-
er, the knowledge, organizational skills and the financial resources of the social actors involved. 
When considering the power relations, the planner distinguishes the part of the plan that can 
be governed directly by the actor from that part that requires the cooperation of other actors to 
achieve the desired goals.
This means that, to enable the plan, the planner must know the actors involved, the 
necessary operations, the strategic means and the time available for the operations to produce 
the desired or expected effect. The following issues need to be clarified: What operations are 
unfeasible in the initial situation? With which actors is it possible to work in order to make unfea-
sible operations feasible? What strategic means can be applied to the operations and actors to 
create conditions favorable to the future viability of the plan? What is the sequence and in what 
time is it possible to locate operations and deal with opponents in order to make the process of 
constructing feasibility more efficient?
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The strategic moment, therefore, includes a feasibility analysis of the plan at three levels: 
the political feasibility, which deals with cooperation strategies and involves negotiations to agree 
common paths of action through reciprocal compromises, where one actor gains the adhesion of 
another to his own position and where conflict serves as a field for the actors to measure the weight 
of their projects; the economic feasibility, which should determine whether the political, economic 
and organizational projects are economically feasible; and the institutional-organizational feasibil-
ity, which will have to determine whether there is sufficient organizational capacity to sustain the 
proposed program, if there exists the  capacity to improve the institutional organization and if the 
organization designated to fulfill the plan is feasible and effective (LANA and GOMES, 1996). 
The tactical-operational moment, in which the key point is to understand that plan-
ning is the result of mediation between knowledge and action, it is the moment to deploy and 
execute the plan, to mobilize the necessary resources. It is action supported planning, creating 
a continuous process between the three previous moments and the daily action. As noted by 
Matus (1996, p. 104), it is concerned with “recalculating the plan and improving it according to 
the circumstances at the time of action and the operational detail that practice demands.” It is at 
this moment that the plan is realigned and improved according to the circumstances at the time 
of action and operational detail that practice requires. 
In fact, as Adum and Coelho (2007, p. 2) point out “planning must be understood as a 
process of learning, correction and learning, that obliges permanent corrections are made to the 
paths of the defined actions.” In other words, the essence of SSP is the ongoing monitoring of 
the situation and the assessment of the results of the decisions taken and deferred judgments, in 
order to check whether the results produced are in the line with the expected results.
As can be seen, from the Situational Strategic Planning (SSP) perspective, the leader’s 
role is that of an individual who understands the situation in which he finds himself, i.e. the place 
where he and the social and actors involved are, and based on an analysis of the situation, ascer-
tains which is action should best be implemented. That means require superhuman ability, but 
a manager who is aware of the situation at any given time. This leadership is capable of under-
standing the dynamics of the situation, the interests of the various players, the time to act and, 
especially, that the same situation does not repeat itself. Therefore, there is no magic formula 
that allows a leader to deliver the desired results, but instead a leader who is aware of the situ-
ation in which he finds himself who seeks to work in partnership and respect the organizational 
capacity of the other actors.
2 The meThod
The method of investigation chosen was oral history, which has been described as “A 
methodology that focuses on the history of the present through the narrative of the subjects and 
allows the researcher to recover that which is not found in other types of documents” (CAPPELLE, 
BORGES and MIRANDA, 2010, p. 5). This method allows the researcher to analyze history from 
the perspective of the actors who participated directly or indirectly in its construction, in this case 
of the creation and planning of the UPPs.
Oral history “is a research methodology that focuses on interviews with people who 
participated in, or witnessed, events, situations, as a way of approaching the object of study” (AL-
BERTI, 1990, p. 2). This methodology should be used in research into contemporary topics, events 
that occurred in the not too distant past, within the range of living human memory, so one can 
interview people who participated in the recent past. A particularly important advantage of using 
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oral history is the production of reference sources for further studies, since they can be grouped 
into a collection and made available to researchers.
Oral history, then, is a proposal that considers the experience is lived and remembered 
differently by each individual, who, when recounting a particular event assigns different patterns 
of importance or of perception. In this sense, “the deliberate production of the oral history docu-
ment allows one to recover that which is not found in other types of documents. Finally, it should 
be noted that the importance of oral testimony may be focused on how it (the event) is remem-
bered” (CAPPELLE, BORGES and MIRANDA, 2010, p. 5).
The greatest potentiality of this type of method is that it rescues the individual as a 
subject in the historical process. Consequently, it reactivates the conflict between freedom and 
determinism or between social structure and human action. Individuals, the key elements for the 
understanding of human life, have often been minimized and marginalized by the scientist who 
believes that personal documents are too subjective, descriptive and arbitrary to contribute to 
scientific advancement. Then, world history has been largely written in the language of rational-
ity and absolute accuracy. Oral History, however, favors the voice of the people, not only of the 
great men, as has occurred. (GOMES and SANTANA, 2010, p. 5). 
The process of investigation or the interview, as stated by Bom Meihy (1996), is com-
posed of three steps: pre-interview, which corresponds to the preparation for the meeting with 
the interviewee; the interview itself, during which the researcher records the interviewees’ state-
ments and can intervene with questions when necessary to better understand the details of 
what is being told, i.e., “how? when? in what way? what for?”; and the post-interview, when the 
recording is finished and procedures are taken to ensure the safety of the material obtained. This 
last step includes the process of textualization, in which the speech is adapted to the structure of 
written text, where the “voice” of the interviewer is suppressed to make the text more enjoyable 
and fluid at the same time, and where, if the researcher considers it necessary, the interviewee’s 
key words are put in italics throughout the text.
It is noteworthy that all interviews began with key questions, then, each interviewee 
told his/her story freely, returning to the initial questions only when the interviewee wandered 
from the topic. The opening questions were about: when the interviewee came into contact with 
the UPP, when and in what context they had first heard about the UPP, if they had participated in 
the planning of the UPPs and what their involvement was.
We interviewed 18 people, including presidents of community residents associations, 
community residents, State Secretaries of Rio de Janeiro and representatives of organizations 
that supported the creation of the UPPs or are involved in other similar initiatives in the same 
state. Each interview lasted approximately two hours and, if any further clarification was nec-
essary, the subject was interviewed again. All the interviews were transcribed and read several 
times in an attempt to identify similarities and differences in each narrative. Although each inter-
viewee deals with the creation of the UPPS from his/her personal point of view, the figure of the 
leader around which the article was developed is central to each story.  
The role of leadership in the creation of the UPPs in Rio de Janeiro from the perspective Situa-
tional Strategic Planning and the Freirean perspective: the case
Origins and inspirations for the UPPs – 2000 to 2007
The first investigations into how the UPPs came into being involved examining academic 
publications and reports in the mass media. In the main data bases of academic journals 30 arti-
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cles were found that addressed the issue of peacemaking in areas experiencing civil war and/ or 
in countries ruled by dictators or in very poor regions, such as parts of Africa, for example. In the 
national and international mass media, reports were found that highlighted the role of the UPPs 
in the communities of Rio de Janeiro city. In the national mass media experiences with public 
safety at major events in Rio de Janeiro were reported to have propelled the UPPs were found, 
especially the Pan American Games, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 2007. Then, people 
involved with the safety of the Pan American Games were contacted for research purposes.
The first interviewee was Lieutenant Colonel Claudete Lehmkuhl, a member of the San-
ta Catarina State Military Police since 1983 and scholar in the field of Public Security Policy and 
adviser to the Federal Ministry of Justice. According to the Lt-Col Lehmkuhl, regarding security 
during the Pan American Games, the Ministry of Justice, first contacted the states and requested 
access to the police databases in order to identify those whose CVs showed knowledge about the 
area of public safety, particularly any that had worked with public safety involving the citizen as 
being co-responsible for the safety of the community. Hence, they contacted her. 
According to Lt-Col Lehmkuhl, the history of the UPPs began with a survey of require-
ments for the Pan American Games. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the 
Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN), carried out  a survey of the state of 
Rio de Janeiro to develop a pilot project in Rio: a public safety project involving community policing. 
The story of the UPPs began in the mid-2000s, prior to the Pan American Games in Rio 
de Janeiro. The idea was to ensure a safe city to host the athletes and the international commu-
nity. The Pan American Games were marked by an innovative initiative, because the Ministry of 
Justice (MJ), through the National Secretariat of Public Security (SENASP), was the body responsi-
ble for organizing and coordinating the safety of the event. Historically, security of major events 
was the responsibility of the Armed Forces. What prompted the Presidency of the Republic to 
choose to make the Ministry of Justice responsible for security was the idea of combining a set of 
preventive actions to the traditional containment activities of the police, to ensure the safety of 
the Pan American Games (Lt-Col Lehmkuhl).
To operationalize security in the city of Rio de Janeiro, some programs were created 
that were only developed in time due to partnerships with organizations in civil society, such 
as representatives from industry, local communities close to where the Games were to be held 
and in partnership with government institutions at the federal and state levels. Among the main 
agencies involved in the implementation of the programs were the Federation of Industries of 
the State of Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN), the Social Service of Industries (SESI/RJ), the National Ap-
prenticeship Service (SENAI/RJ) and the Micro and Small Enterprises Support Service (SEBRAE/
RJ). A Letter Agreement was also signed with the Central Union of Favelas (CUFA), with the goal of 
providing training courses for community leaders. The CUFA, in turn, would mediate between the 
implementing organizations, SENASP/MJ and the community leaders. The Public Ministry of the 
State of Rio de Janeiro, the Public Defense Agency of the State of Rio de Janeiro, the Secretary of 
State for Social Assistance and Human Rights and the Institute of Public Security of Rio de Janeiro 
also acted as implementing agencies (LEHMKUHL, 2010 p. 72-3).
According to Moema Freire (from the Unit for Social Policies of the United Nations De-
velopment Program (UNDP)), the Brazilian government was inspired by a project implemented in 
Bogotá (Colombia) to establish a new model of public safety. So much so that several multipliers, 
mainly representatives of Rio de Janeiro police went to see the  experiment on-site and participate 
in training in that country. This concept of Public Safety, Community Police, is greatly inspired by the 
experience of Bogotá, Medellín. The idea of  having a safe city, at the time, was because we did not 
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want to repeat the scenario of Rio 92. Then, the tanks in the streets, the frightened people, army 
soldiers on the slopes of the hills of Rio and the entrances to the city and local events guarded by 
army tanks. We did not want to repeat this scenario in the Pan American Games. It was necessary to 
involve the population in public safety. All this, had the support of FIRJAN, from the beginning. Some 
events were funded by FIRJAN so we could work closer to the population in Rio (Moema Freire).
The participation of FIRJAN is one of the questions that always arises when the subject 
matter is public safety, “which does the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro 
have to do with public safety?” And in answer to this question: “in 2006 FIRJAN made  a map of 
development because the situation was desperate. We had no business representation in Rio. 
The few companies remained had transferred their main offices to São Paulo ... Gerdau CSN ... 
everyone using bullet-proof cars. Rio was becoming one of the most violent cities in the world. 
That tension was too much to live effectively. Even today, many of our member companies are 
still there, the entrepreneur is in Sao Paulo. It was necessary to do something to bring them back 
(Andrea Marinho, Director of Education FIRJAN in an interview).
The comments from the President of FIRJAN are also quite informative: I think, at first 
the government did not understand what we wanted to do. But our agenda was also in the public 
interest. The business class is also part of the population of Rio de Janeiro, it creates jobs, provides 
resources for the State. It was necessary to do something. And we began to support initiatives 
that focused on public safety. We put our staff on hand to train, negotiate and finance (Eduardo 
Eugenio, President of FIRJAN in an interview).
The idea of  Matus (1996) of knowing the widest possible range of actors involved in the 
game was crucial to enlist partnerships in Rio de Janeiro, the government itself, industry and civil 
society to seek people whose interest, although they might be motivated from different perspec-
tives, would make Rio de Janeiro a safer city to live in, visit and to set up a business.
This operation, which was closed after the Pan American Games, showed the Public Security 
Bureau of Rio de Janeiro there were new possibilities. But it was also a stopgap measure because the 
violence after the Games remained the same and, in certain regions, it even became worse.
New leadership in the Public Security Bureau of the State of Rio de Janeiro: planning starts 
from 2007 - the beginning of the UPPs
In 2007, the year that the subject (José Mariano Beltrame) highlighted in this article as-
sumed the position of Secretary of the Public Security Bureau of the State of Rio de Janeiro, violence 
in the city was acquiring new facets with turf wars on the hills of the city between the major drug 
trafficking gangs in Rio de Janeiro. When I was asked to be Secretary of Public Security, I formed 
a team and together we started to think about how we could make a difference in Rio de Janeiro 
and not just spend one term in office. I think the first thing that became clear to everyone was the 
willingness to do something. It was then that we began to analyze crime rates in the city. They were 
obviously linked to violence within the areas of hills (in the favelas). In those areas, there was a huge 
amount of weapons and disputes between different drug trafficking factions and with the militias, 
prevented the military police from climbing the hills and entering the favelas. In those places, there 
was a dictatorship in which criminals decided everything as if they were the judiciary. (José Mariano 
Beltrame, Secretary of Public Security Bureau (PSB/RJ) since January 2007).
When asked about the experiments conducted previously to contain the violence in Rio de 
Janeiro, the Secretary said that at the time did not know about the experiments carried out for the 
purpose of hosting the Pan American Games, but had studied what had been done to understand 
Rev. Adm. UFSM, Santa Maria, v. 9, número 4, p. 624-643, SET. - DEZ. 2016
- 634 -
The Role of Leadership in the Creation and Planning of Pacification Police Units (UPPs) 
in Rio de Janeiro
what had gone wrong. I think people do not realize that the city of Rio de Janeiro is like a chessboard. 
The inspiration was not the experience of Medellín - the inspiration was the chessboard. I have the 
black squares and white squares. My idea was to have it all one color. Not all black or all white, but 
a mix of the colors. So my team and I had to answer a question: “what do we have to do to mix the 
colors?” The idea was not to end the favelas, but to end the tyranny that was there inside them, 
imposed by the weapons of the drug traffickers and the militias. It was a war zone where traffickers 
and militias determined who could climb the hill and even until what time. In the midst of the city 
of Rio de Janeiro there were areas where the State did enter and the poorest citizens were held hos-
tage by traffickers and heavily armed militias. (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ).
Hence, there was a need to retake the territories. First, it was necessary to ensure that 
these territories were returned to State, that the State had some power in these territories. Any 
long-lasting action could only occur with the return of the territories dominated by the drug 
traffickers. The repossession of the spaces under the control of traffickers was necessary the 
first step to be able to “come to stay”. It is with this “come to stay” perspective, that the story of 
“citizen security” takes a new direction and retraces its path to install community police called 
Pacification Police Units (UPPs). 
To begin with, the Secretary of Public Security Jose Mariano Beltrame, said that it was 
a struggle to adopt the name the UPP.  Using the word “pacification” was a big problem because 
it might give the impression Rio was at war. Then I said, people, if you are not convinced that 
these islands of violence are part of the state of Rio de Janeiro, we will not solve this problem. 
Yes, we’re at war. First, you need to recognize that. We can’t act as if those areas were not Rio de 
Janeiro. That is an area at war in Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, you (Governor and other Secretaries 
of the State of Rio de Janeiro in a meeting) must assimilate that and have to treat this as a war. It 
is only by recognizing what is happening, by recognizing there is a war in Rio de Janeiro that we 
can start addressing the problem. Then, point number one is to understand and become aware of 
the situation. It was also necessary to recognize that the police have problems, that, because of 
the war, you have this mountain of malignancies, because the police has been trained to engage 
in war and not to provide a service (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ).
As already highlighted by Matus (1991), using Situational Strategic Planning (SSP) re-
quires this appreciation of reality, ‘face it head on and with no makeup.’ The interviews with the 
Secretary of Security, Mariano Beltrame, show signs of the organizational processes that lead to 
establishment of the first UPPs. But also make it clear that the communities that would receive 
the UPPs did not participate in their formulation.
But back to the beginning, the story of the creation and planning of the UPPs.
I say that the UPP is much more about the intention to act, than to build this as a thesis, 
a plan, because I thought the following ... In four (4) years, I need to show that what we can do, 
and show that it is possible to show that we know how ... If I were to design it, write it, make a 
plan, I would not do it in one term in office. Because, after making the plan, I would need another 
term in office to sell the idea and then another to execute the logistics to put the plan into action. 
(José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ)
Already in his first comment “the UPP is much more about the intention to act, than to 
build this as a thesis, a plan” the Secretary signals both urgency in seeking to solve a problem that 
has been mounting up in the state of Rio de Janeiro, and the will that goes directly to the doing, 
the “fazimento”, in the words of Darcy Ribeiro. An expression which emphasizes that ideas must 
go hand in hand with action; that also emphasizes action and process, as things may also need 
“redoing” (Ribeiro, 1997)., 
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I think the whole of society in Rio knew what had to be done, that was to enter and stay 
in those areas. Now, what was planned was the following: how to enter and stay? How will you 
do that? So that’s what we did ... we thought about how we would get in there to stay.
In the first months, we (public security service team) analyzed the city as a whole and 
saw that it was marked, it was like a chessboard ... You have places in Rio de Janeiro that are like 
an ordinary, common city, like any other. And you see that within this normal city, you have islands 
of pure violence, of exclusion ... You have a dictatorship imposed by crime, traffickers or militia 
and in which the State was not present. (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ)
The above comment from the Secretary of Public Security reflects what Matus (1996) 
refers to as the explanatory moment, as the author also points out that working with problems 
also means: explaining how a problem arises and develops; it is exactly the first step: seek to de-
scribe the problem by pointing out the facts that show that the problem really exists.
So first, we mapped the complexes. We took 40 large complexes of favelas. When we 
talk about Rocinha (one of the largest slums in Latin America), we are not talking about Rocinha. 
It’s Rocinha, Vidigal and Chácara do Céu, there is no point taking Rocinha, if the gangs move over 
Vidigal. And so on. There’s no pint taking Nova Holanda,, if you don’t occupy the Baixo Sapateiro 
and all the others favelas that make up the Maré, for example. Tijuca has 17 hills and there you 
have the three factions. That’s why there are the tracer bullets. It is one gang fighting with an-
other. It is not with the police. The police are an ingredient in this fight. They heard about Rocinha 
all over the the world, why? It was Bem-te-vi (one of the best known drug dealers) who wanted 
to take I don’t know what from I don’t know who. Vidigal fought with Rocinha. Business, market. 
They were there after drug outlets. (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ)
When Matus (1996) refers to moments in SSP, he is suggesting it is necessary to take 
one step after another. The reality is much more complex and there is no way of even thinking of 
planning without knowing the reality, just to be able to start thinking about how to act consider-
ing all the actors/players involved.
We had this ... the idea of arriving to stay in a community dominated by drug traffickers 
... more or less in place, but I said: “There’s no point writing it here. We will spend a year here with-
out giving a definite response”. If I were to plan it, write it, I would not do that in a four year term 
in office; after another four years to convince the Governor. Because, the logistics that I need, It’d 
take another 4 years, plus another four years to convince another person, another governor to ‘buy’ 
my idea. At the time I said “let’s get inside a small little place, do a test. I’m not going there, dream 
about occupying Cidade de Deus, for example. Let’s start small.” (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ)
This can be understood as the moment the plan was conceived, identifying the actions 
which could be implemented to address the problems. Matus (1991) reminds us that efficient plan-
ners are not those for whom the details of everyday life are an abstraction, on the contrary: they are 
immersed in them and are able to find the right moment to act. Thought and action must be united. 
New leadership practices in the Public Security Bureau of the State of Rio de Janeiro: the first 
UPP in 2008
What happened was that, from the moment of the plans conception it was put into 
action. It happened suddenly. I saw an opportunity because I knew the situation in Morro Santa 
Marta. In December 2008, there was a large police operation there and the result was that ‘Dona 
Marta’ was kind of ‘headless’. The crime leaders had been arrested and the main leader had been 
killed in confrontation with the police. So I said to my staff, “it’s now or never. Let’s seize the op-
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portunity, if not another gang leader is going assume the role of community leader” We went to 
Morro Santa Marta, went in there and we occupied a former nursery school that had belonged 
to the City Hall that the drug traffickers did not let the community use. This also provoked us. 
We went to the Morro Santa Mart ... But there was that thing ... We had no new police officers 
to put there ... Police trained in a policy of working with the community. They were officers form 
the Battalion selected by the Commander ... It was an impromptu thing ... And the improvisation 
work very well. Crime rates fell inside there. I’ve been there, in Morro Santa Marta, four years ago 
without a single homicide. (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ).
Morro Santa Marta, in the neighborhood of Botafogo, in the South Zone of Rio, was the 
first to receive a Pacification Police Unit, which was inaugurated on December 19, 2008. This is 
the first experience of the Security Bureau of State Rio de Janeiro with the “community policing’ 
policy, the police officer-public servant. Since then the unit has operated 112 officers who have 
been trained in a specialized course to learn how to work together with the community. The idea 
is to reduce overt policing and introduce community policing.
And so the UPP began: there was a problem with a reporter there in Morro Santa Marta. 
They kidnapped a reporter and it was a militia leader, Nick. He was the leader of the militia who 
dominated there too. We arrested Nick, so the favela was leaderless. Let’s go there.... The team 
asked, “how way?”. I just said “let’s go there”. We’re not going to miss this chance. This is our little 
project happening here .... Our plan was taking shape .... We still were thinking about how to put 
this on paper and then we climbed Morro Santa Marta because it was time, and it was time and 
we couldn’t miss the opportunity. There, we went and took the Bangu Battalion. The Battalion 
entered, was there about 30 days, we managed to form a group .... We started working there 
without the full structure.
At the beginning it was me and her (the wife of the Secretary of Security who was pres-
ent during this interview) in Morro Santa Marta. Everything that happened in Santa Marta was 
because me and Rita (his wife) did it. She even provided welfare assistance, to try and encourage 
the people to become enthusiastic about the police presence. We managed to place a few doctors 
there. At first, it was me, the Bangu Battalion and my wife. There was no support from the State 
because the State did not know it would work. But we saw an opportunity and we could not miss 
it. That’s when I began to speak with other government departments. I said, “folks, this here has 
to work. The Public Security Bureau came and won back the territory with regard to the safety 
of the population. The population was no longer held hostage by traffickers and militia. But now, 
if the rest of the State doesn’t appear there to meet social demand, the police will not be able 
to hold it. Everything will go back to the way it was before. It was necessary to engage with the 
community. Provide public facilities and services, but without taking away the autonomy of the 
community. But while the rest of the State was not convinced that this action would work, no-one 
came.”(José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ)
We remember that for Matus (1996), the greater the planner’s ability to understand 
the game and the diverse interests of the players, - the greater the planner’s knowledge of the 
situation and how the players operate, the greater that planner will be. It was only possible to 
determine that it was the time to take Morro Santa Marta because the social dynamics within 
that context were known.
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The initiative of new leaders that culminated in new UPP: the planning was being conducted 
together with the action
Meanwhile, the Commander of Jacarepaguá, where Cidade de Deus is located, just said: 
“Secretary, I’m going to occupy the favela, Cidade de Deus. Just me”.... it was his personal chal-
lenge. He went there and occupied it … occupied it and it worked. It was sort of beyond our team 
... He went there, occupied it and it worked. I said: “We can’t go back, right?” So I went there and 
provided support. Soon after, we went to the Morro do Batam in Realengo. It was also an oppor-
tunity not to be missed. Just like Morro Santa Marta, the drug traffickers in Batam had also lost 
their leader and were regrouping. So we went there and didn’t leave anymore. Then, after that, 
things began to fall into place. Then I talked to the staff and said “now is the time to organize 
some of this on paper. It’s time to go back to the little project, to write about what we’re doing.” 
(José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ)
The entry of the police in the communities of Dona Marta, Cidade de Deus and Batam 
are concrete expressions of SSP: a combination of calculation and gambles based on knowledge 
of the situation, the interplay between the reality and the actors/players involved in the game. As 
stated by Matus (1996), the plan is a gamble, though for some it may seem like a lack of system-
atization. Then, it is important to remember that, when considering reality in the elaboration of 
a plan, the result depends not only on the plan itself, but also on circumstances that are neither 
controllable nor predictable.
It can be clearly seen that other leaders emerged and they were supported in their ef-
forts by the leader, although the latter had no institutional support from the State. Support, for 
these initiatives and these leaders both allows the development of Situational Strategic Planning 
and the emergence of new leaders interested in transforming reality. As pointed out by Gomes 
and Lírio (2014), in public administration, the involvement and commitment of the leaders and 
staff they lead is essential for the implementation of the planning.
As Freire (1970), states, it is not possible for the real leader to see the other subjects of 
the action as mere doers and executors of his decisions. If that were to occur, the other subjects 
of the action would be denied the opportunity to reflect on their own ‘doing’. These subjects 
would only have the illusion of acting in the role of leadership, i.e., they would be mere perform-
ers. For Freire (1970), to the degree that the leader denies true praxis to other subjects of the 
action, his own leadership is diminished. 
Things began to fall into place. We stopped entering certain communities merely be-
cause we saw an opportunity … because no one could deal with it alone. What are the police 
going to do without the support of the rest of the State? Just enter and leave. Would it repeat the 
same story as before? We had to go in and the other departments had to come in behind us. After 
Cidade de Deus, I saw that if there was no strong engagement, our ideas and actions would be 
unsustainable. Just me and her (the wife of the Secretary of Security) and a few staff members, it 
would not work. We needed the support of the State, backing from the Government.  
So, I went to the Governor and said: “You need to gather the secretaries, city hall and 
name somebody ... A pivot for all this.” I have at least 40 more communities that need this same 
type of action. Plus the whole city, that has something every day. “You need to appoint a coordi-
nator.”Then, the Governor created the Social Pacification Police Unit and named Ricardo Henri-
ques (Coordinator of the UPP Social - a unit that represents the union between the State and the 
municipality of Rio de Janeiro in meeting the social needs of the population) as coordinator and 
I began to feel relieved, I ordered people to look for UPP Social. It was then that the government 
of Rio de Janeiro began to offer support to what, in fact, was an idea that was already underway, 
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which had already been implemented in three favelas in Rio de Janeiro, and especially to an idea 
that was working. It was good, when I feel alone, I just go after the guys and say “Is the State 
missing here.” When the UPP Social arrived, it was the State coming to meet the social demand. 
It was not just the police. So, nursery schools began to enter, together with school and health 
centers. Sometimes we even had the installations, the buildings, but they did not work. So, the 
state arrived and made them work. It is much better than it was. That’s how the UPPs started. 
When the state saw that the initiative was working in the communities, it began to provide sup-
port. When you begin to see crime rates drop, there is a good impact in the media ... And people 
jump in. When the Governor saw that actions we had taken were getting results, then he also 
began to apply pressure to the public security team. He wanted to see the whole city with UPPs. 
When the baby is cute, everyone wants to be the father, right? So today, if it were up to the State, 
we would create one UPP per month in the deprived communities in the hills of Rio de Janeiro. 
But that’s not the way, no. you have to go little by little, not just jump. You have to first know the 
community well and who’s operating there, you have to know the dynamics of each community. 
(José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ)
This is a time of adjustments between the formal and informal, a time to plan based on 
the results of actions that seem more informal. This could also be seen as a strategic moment, 
a time to face and analyze the feasibility of the plan, of what is already being done, mainly its 
political feasibility, to find out ‘what more can be done’ and ‘how to do it’, to attempt to identify 
suitable strategies. According to Vieira, Correia and Lavarda (2013, p. 590), “there are no formal 
place defined under organizational processes to develop strategies, they are taken under the 
problem umbrella with collaborative work with the best-found solving practice”. To ensure the 
continuity of the UPPs, it was necessary to review the police force in Rio de Janeiro, revise the 
curriculum and the type of training offered to the police officers.
Then we realized that we had another problem on our hands. How do we apply commu-
nity policing when we don’t have community police? We only have police officers that make war. 
The police are not Community Police. The Academy teaches them to make war. So we started a 
special Community Police training course to prepare officers to work in the UPPs with the commu-
nities to be able to meet the needs of the people in the community. So we begin by reformulating 
the curriculum of the Academy, to form a police officer-server, community policing. Reforming the 
curriculum of the military police took a year. As difficult as occupying the Complexo do Alemão 
(one of the most violent areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro, formed by a set of twelve favelas), it 
was to try to change the mind of the police. (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ)
This was also a key phase for the continuance of the plan and, at the same time, it is 
the result of a plan drawn up at the time of the action itself. It was a time to get government 
support on other fronts, to reinforce an idea with actions to ensure its continuity, changing po-
lice training, for example. It was a time to seek the support of other leaders that were emerging, 
including within the occupied communities. While we sought support from universities to change 
the curriculum of the Military Police, the leaders of the UPPs that were already working sought 
support from residents of the communities in which they were located. We already knew that past 
unsuccessful plans share a common variable: the police didn’t work in partnership with the popu-
lation. In previous experiences, the police merely watched the residents of the communities. Now, 
we already knew that for the State to arrive and stay it was necessary to work with communities 
and not for them. (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ).
In the words of Freire (1970, p. 61) with regards the leader, it is the time when the true 
leader opens a bold dialog with the masses. His legitimacy is in dialogue with them, not in decep-
tion, manipulation or lie. The true leader cannot be afraid of the masses, their expressiveness, 
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their effective participation in power. He cannot ignore their knowledge. He cannot fail to provide 
them with a full account, to talk about his successes, his mistakes, their mistakes, his difficulties.
The comments provided by the Chief Secretary of Staff, Régis Fischer, corroborate those 
made by the Secretary of Public Security, Jose Mariano Beltrame. When we were in Morro Santa 
Marta, in the Cidade de Deus and Batam, we thought: “we’re doing something different here. But 
what can we do so that everything can turn out right?”. Then, we had the opportunity to provide 
training for a few police officers in Batam, there with Beltrame. But then came the following 
drama, when we thought, “how are we going to do what it takes to make it work on a scale that 
actually reverses the crime rate in Rio de Janeiro?”. When we analyzed the issue, we saw that 
our problem was how to put new police officers in the field because the Police Academy Train-
ing Center (CEFAP) lacked the capacity to handle the number of officers that would be needed. 
Then you begin to find the bottlenecks. We remembered how the CEFAP worked. As incredible 
as it seems, In the Military Police, teaching the new recruits was seen almost as a punishment 
for the instructor. For the member of public security services that committed some mistake, did 
something wrong, the punishment was to go to CEFAP, situated in the West Zone, far away from 
the city center of Rio de Janeiro. This used to be the way of pulling the bad officer off the street, 
assigning him to teach at the CEFAP. Usually, the officers teaching the newcomers to the Military 
Police had issues involving questionable behavior. There you can see the type of training received 
by the new members of the Military Police. (Régis Fischer, Secretary of the UPP Social).
The key point of the tactical-operational moment, in this case, the implementation of 
the UPPs, is to understand that planning is the result of mediation between knowledge and ac-
tion. As Matus (1996, p. 104) points out, it is about “recalculating the plan and improving it 
according to the circumstances at the time of the action and operational detail that practice re-
quires.” It is about remaking the plan in order to put into practice new ideas, reflecting on them 
and redoing them in a better way.
From the Freirean perspective, this ‘remaking’ is the defense of praxis, the “theory of 
doing”, It is not to propose a dichotomy in which “doing” is divided into one stage of reflection 
and another, distant, of action. Action and reflection occur simultaneously. What may happen, 
when performing critical-reflexive analysis, about reality, about its contradictions, is that one 
realizes the impossibility of a certain action or that it is inappropriate at that time. But, the very 
perception that that particular action is not feasible at a given time does not negate the action of 
those undertaking that reflection. For Paulo Freire, that reflection is also action.
According to the Secretary of Public Security, no two occupation processes are the same 
and there’s never going to a manual that tells me exactly how to do it. Even, the stance of the 
police is different. So, entering and staying in each of these communities is a different process. 
There’s a different way for each one. You can’t repeat the same recipe. It is more or less the same 
thing, but it’s not. Of course, using police officers, with the support of BOPE will, even the army 
has been employed; in other, we have used the helicopter. The way to get in is different, people 
are different, welcome us in different ways, the environment is different, and it all counts. That’s 
right, no occupation that is the same as another, and there never will be a manual that tells me 
how I’m going to do it in Maré and I’ll do the same in Vidigal (José Mariano Beltrame, PSB/RJ).
Considering different ways to occupy the community, due to the peculiarities of each 
one, demonstrates planning according to the situation. For Matus (1996), there is no single way 
to make a plan because it depends on the characteristics of the reality to which it will be applied. 
SSP takes into account that a certain situation-objective is also conditional on indeterminate sce-
narios and occurrences because reality is not predictable.
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I have to admit, at first, we did not design anything, we did not plan it, we didn’t even 
train new leaders, there was no time. We made attempts. A “plan” even a written plan, a plan of 
the occupation, was only developed when we started thinking about creating a UPP in Rocinha. 
(José Mariano Beltrame)
Indeed, as highlighted throughout the text on SSP, “planning must be understood as a 
process of learning-correction and learning, stressing the achievements of permanent correc-
tions to the direction of the defined actions” (ADUM and COELHO, 2007, p. 2). In other words, 
SSP is, in essence, the constant monitoring of reality and the evaluation of the results of the de-
cisions taken and those considered but not taken in order to verify whether the results produced 
are consistent with the expected results. This is what has been carried out since the establish-
ment of the first UPP in Morro Santa Marta. Perhaps, not with a formal plan as in traditional or 
normative planning, but a plan that takes into account the reality and, therefore, the situation of 
each community and that has proven very effective. Principally, an action that neither denies the 
role of leadership nor that of the led. In fact, it makes all those involved into a team that includes 
all the leaders of the communities, the men and women concerned. This means that leaders do 
not reduce the communities to mere executors of decisions made by the leaders of the Public 
Security Bureau of the State of Rio de Janeiro.
From the Freirean perspective, leadership is not denied, rather, it is considered essen-
tial. What is denied is the absurd division between the praxis of the leader and praxis of the team 
members, as if the role of the followers was merely to obey the decisions of the leadership. For 
Freire (1970), this dichotomy exists only as a necessary condition to a situation of domination, 
in which the leader prescribes and the followers follow the prescriptions. In true leadership, for 
Freire (1970), there is a unity in which the leadership does not make the led not the object of his 
possession. Instead, the relationship is a dialogue.
It is necessary to know, furthermore, that leadership is also a teaching-learning relation-
ship. Thus, if the creation of the UPPs occurred due to the recognized initiative of one or a few 
men, it must be recognized that, currently, they are a model of public security and policing which 
promotes closer relations between the population and the police, as well as the strengthening of 
social policy in the communities. By recovering territories occupied for decades by drug traffick-
ers and militias, the UPPs also contribute towards the self organization of the communities. After 
all, their innovative character is defined by the attempt, at first, to pacify the underprivileged 
community and this takes place with the return of territories that were or are still dominated by 
drug traffickers. After the recovering the territories, with more overt policing, the Military Police 
permanently occupy communities where the State had not been present.
Finally, with the success of the first UPP, installed in the community of Morro Santa Mar-
ta in Botafogo, in November 2008, the Governor of Rio de Janeiro, formalized the existence of the 
“Pacification Police Unit’ (UPP) by Decree No. 41,650 of January 21, 2009. Currently, there are 
already 37 UPPs, in which over 1 million people benefit directly from the units and the plan is to 
install 50 UPPs by 2016. It should be remembered that, when talking about 50 communities there 
are, in fact, 200 or maybe 300. In the Maré favela alone, for example, there are 15 communities 
and in the Complexo do Alemão, there are 13.
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4 final RemaRks
Working with Situational Strategic Planning (SSP) is more or less like taking the first 
steps to understanding that “men make their own history, but they do not so as they would 
want; they do not do it under circumstances of their choice but under those with which they are 
directly confronted”(MARX, 1997, p. 21). We must also add that men also act base on certain 
perspectives. As Matus (1991, 1996) noted, one can imagine, compose a range of possibilities, 
participate in history, but you cannot define one’s destiny. That is the case of the UPPs, they are 
truly examples of organizations in the making, the success of which depends on the growing 
participation of the State, society, and especially of the communities where they are installed. 
Without this active participation, history shows that there is nothing to prevent the war zones 
from being re-established in Rio de Janeiro.
This is because those who work with the Situational Strategic Planning (SSP), work with 
the notion of the real system, since it is in these that we live our social practice and this is what we 
find in our daily experience. It is what Matus (1996) calls the “system of hard uncertainty.” It is a 
model that recognizes that there is asymmetry between the past and the future. The past is over, 
everything that could have happened has already happened; the future is open to many possibil-
ities and we cannot imagine them all. But we can be creative! We can enumerate future possibil-
ities, but never all of them, of course. And, even with all this uncertainty, it is the world in which 
we must govern and plan. What was also observed throughout this research, listening to countless 
narratives, is that the actions taken in order to implement the UPPs originated in the Public Security 
Bureau, with isolated incursions into communities dominated by drug traffickers, which became 
institutionally recognized when the society itself began to manifest itself in favor of the UPPs and 
especially when crime rates began to decline in the regions where the UPPs were installed.
The story of the UPPs was found to revolve around the existence or not of leaders in-
side and outside the favelas. The first territories were retaken by the State because the leader of 
drug traffickers in the region was killed or, as stated earlier, it was a moment where the slum was 
leaderless and people were still reorganizing themselves. It was at this time that the leadership 
of the Public Security Bureau, perceiving the lack of leadership, entered and retook for the State 
a territory that had been under the control of traffickers and militia for over twenty years. Even 
with 37 UPPs already installed in the city of Rio de Janeiro, each one being the result of a different 
experience with the communities, the role of the leaders in the favelas is still emphasized. They 
are territorial disputes and each territory that is retaken by the State is a struggle, sometimes 
armed, with the leaders from the favelas. In the first territories to be retaken, there were fre-
quent violent gun battles and, therefore, the police and the army were used to climb the hills in 
assaults that surprised the residents of the communities. Today, when such actions are carried 
out by Public Safety Bureau the people are informed in advance and the most recent operations 
to recover territories have occurred without a shot being fired. The police officers are better 
trained in community policing and particularly, the communities in the favelas demand that the 
government locates UPPs in their regions.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to avoid creating a new situation of dependence in the 
communities, i.e., new leaders must emerge from within the community and not just replace the 
leadership of the drug traffickers and militias with the leadership of the police. As noted by Freire 
(1970), however well-intentioned an action it will only be liberating if it recognizes the ability for 
self-management of the people and communities. Failure to recognize this ability means creating 
new situations of dependency.
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Attention needs to given to both the police participation in the life of the communities 
whose territory has been retaken by the State and the level of real participation on the part of 
the community in decisions affecting that territory. If this perspective is lost, we will have the 
mere substitution of one leadership for another, instead of the community deciding its destiny. 
The proposal of reincorporating territories into the State so that it can provide the services for 
which it is responsible, such as health and education, should be replaced by a situation in which 
the representatives of the police become local leaders. The representatives of the police, in the 
UPPs must be there to ensure that the communities have the right to organize themselves. As 
highlighted by Freire (1970), real transformations take place in the context of co-intentionality. 
Community and State co-intentioned to the reality, find themselves engaged in a task in which 
both are subjects in the action, not only to know reality, but also in the act of recreating it. So 
that, the community and the State discover themselves to be permanent ‘remakers’ of reality, 
in such a way that the presence of the community in search of its liberation, will be more than 
pseudo-participation, it will be what it should be: engagement.
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